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Jurisdictional Gap in Reality or Only in
Law Reviews? -The Circuit Split on the




Under international law, the United States is empowered
under the nationality principle to prescribe rules to regulate the
conduct of its nationals anywhere in the world.1 There is no doubt
that Congress has exercised this power by creating federal criminal
statutes that apply extraterritorially.2
Recently, however, federal circuits have split on the issue of
whether Congress intended to do so through criminal statutes that
apply within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" of
the United States.3 For the purposes of the statutes recently at
issue, the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction" of the
United States is limited to:
Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States,
and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or
any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States
by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall
* The author would like to thank Robert M. Ackerman, Professor of Law at
The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University, John M.
Coles, and Sarah E. Henry for their valuable suggestions and support.
1. Nationality jurisdiction under international law allows a state to prescribe
laws regulating the conduct of its nationals wherever they are in the universe. See
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 388, 396-
97 n.15 (1996) (explaining general principles of jurisdiction that provide for the
nationality principle).
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 112(e) (protection of foreign officials, official guests,
and internationally protected persons).
3. See United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
876 (1973); United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 2000); United States v.
Corey, 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
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be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or
other needful building.4
Twenty-seven years ago, in United States v. Erdos,5 the Fourth
Circuit held that the "lands reserved or acquired" portion of this
language applied to acts of American nationals on United States
embassy grounds in foreign countries.6 In the years thereafter,
federal prosecutors showed little interest in extending the judicial
reach of this decision. Recently, however, prosecutors in United
States v. Gatlin7 and United States v. Corey8 have attempted to
extend this ruling to reach the conduct of American nationals on
overseas military bases and in apartments leased by the United
States government overseas.
Just last year, in United States v. Gatlin, the Second Circuit
criticized the Fourth Circuit's Erdos decision and held that § 7(3)
does not apply extraterritorially.9 The court also emphasized its
belief that a jurisdictional gap existed for civilian dependants
accompanying the military on overseas tours of duty." Months
later, in United States v. Corey, the Ninth Circuit split with the
Second Circuit when it held that § 7(3) does apply extra-
territorially.1 The Corey court also dismissed the existence of a
jurisdictional gap. 2
This comment explores the recent debate over whether 18
U.S.C. § 7(3) applies extraterritorially. First, Section II provides an
overview of the presumption against extraterritorial application of
federal statutes and the history of § 7(3). Section III presents a
detailed look at the split in the federal circuits over extraterritorial
application of § 7(3). It traces three significant cases, outlining their
factual and procedural backgrounds as well as the reasoning behind
the Fourth, Second, and Ninth Circuits' conflicting resolutions to
the same problem. Section IV argues that § 7(3) should not be
4. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1994).
5. 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
6. Erdos, 474 F.2d at 159.
7. 216 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 2000).
8. 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
9. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 223.
10. Id. at 222-23 ("In short, for over fifty years, there has been a consensus-
among all three branches of the federal government as well as academic
commentators-that, nothwithstanding the existence of § 7(3) and its precursors,
United States courts lack jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians
accompanying the military overseas ... Our decision today is only the latest
consequence of Congress's failure to close this jurisdictional gap.").
11. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1183.
12. Id.
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applied extraterritorially. It concentrates on the application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the legislative history of
§ 7(3). It also examines errors in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits'
reasoning. Section V argues that the recent enactment of the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 200013 is further
evidence that Congress did not and does not intend for § 7(3) to
apply extraterritorially. Finally, this comment concludes that § 7(3)
should not be applied outside the continental United States.
Section VI notes certain inconsistencies in and potential
consequences of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' logic and recom-
mends resolution of the federal conflict in favor of limiting the
application of § 7(3) to the continental United States.
II. Background: The Presumption Against the Extraterritorial
Application of Federal Statutes and the History of 18 U.S.C. §
7(3)
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of Federal
Statutes
There is a "longstanding principle of American law 'that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."'14
This presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes
"serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord.
1 5
In addition, it recognizes that Congress is "primarily concerned
with domestic conditions.
1 6
The Supreme Court requires "clear evidence of congressional
intent" to apply a statute beyond U.S. borders to justify extra-
territorial application. 7 This clear evidence may be derived from
"all available evidence" about the meaning of the statute, including
text, structure, and legislative history. In the absence of such
evidence, courts must "assume that Congress legislates against a
13. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114
Stat. 2488 ; 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq. (2000).
14. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
("Aramco")).
15. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Aramco").
16. Foley Bros. V. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949).
17. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,204 (1993).
18. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993).
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backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality. '1 9 Thus, if
extraterritorial application is not evident, courts are to assume that
Congress did not intend for the statute in question to apply outside
the United States.
B. The History of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)
Section 7(3) can be traced back to legislation passed by the
First Congress, "An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes
Against the United States."'2  Unlike the current act which
establishes the jurisdictional provision in 18 U.S.C. § 7, the 1790
Act incorporated jurisdictional limits into the substantive definition
of each separate offense." Specifically, federal court jurisdiction
was limited to certain lands "under the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States."22
Although the 1790 Act was codified and slightly amended in
1874,23 it remained substantially unchanged until 1909 when the
60th Congress passed "An Act To codify, revise, and amend the
penal laws of the United States."24 In the 1909 Act, Congress for
the first time codified jurisdictional limits in a separate statute.25
However, this statute, like the individual sections of the 1790 Act,
limited jurisdiction solely to lands under the "exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States."26 In fact, several Congressmen who served
on the committee that recommended the Act specifically noted that
jurisdiction of the 1790 Act was in no way expanded in the 1909
Act.
27
19. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
20. Act of April 30, 1790 ("1790 Act"), ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
21. See, e.g., id. at §§ 3, 6-7, 13, 16.
22. Id.
23. See 70 Rev. Stat., ch. 3, § 5339 (1874).
24. Act of March 4, 1909 ("1909 Act"), ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088.
25. The jurisdictional section of the 1909 Act provided that the admiralty and
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States included: "any lands
reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the United States, and under the
exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the
United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be,
for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dock-yard, or other needful building."
1909 Act, ch. 321, § 272, 35 Stat. at 1143.
26. 1909 Act, ch. 321, § 272, 35 Stat. at 1143.
27. See 42 CONG. REC. 1186 (1908) (statement of Sen. Heyburn) (The 1909
Act "does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the United States courts by a hair's
breadth .... We have simply gathered up a large number of existing provisions in
the various statutes ... in order to avoid repetition with each separate section in its
geographical jurisdiction."); see also id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Sherley) ("We
have made no change in existing law in the way of the enactment that was not
plainly in furtherance of the existing law.").
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In 1940, the 76th Congress expanded the statutory scope of the
1909 Act to include land over which the federal government had
"concurrent" jurisdiction.28 However, this additional language was
not necessarily meant to expand federal court jurisdiction. The
legislative history of the 1940 Act instead reveals that Congress may
have been simply attempting to respond to the 1937 United States
Supreme Court decision, James v. Dravo Contracting Company,29
which held that states that consensually transferred land to the
federal government could retain partial or concurrent jurisdiction
over those lands. ° In either event, there is no explicit indication in
the legislative history that Congress intended the 1940 Act to apply
extraterritorially.
The 1940 Act contained what is now known as § 7(3). Whether
§ 7(3) applies extraterritorially is the topic of the recent split among
three of the federal circuit courts of appeal.
III. Federal Circuit Split: Does Section 7(3) Apply
Extraterritorially?
A. United States v. Erdos: Section 7(3) Applies to United States
Embassies Abroad
In February of 1973, in United States v. Erdos,1 the Fourth
Circuit became the first appellate authority to apply § 7(3) extra-
territorially.32 In this case an American citizen killed another
American citizen in the United States embassy in the Republic of
28. See Act of June 11, 1940, ch. 323, 54 Stat. 304 (1940) ("When committed
within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and
under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or
otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State
in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard,
or other needful building.").
29. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
30. See H.R.Rep. No. 76-1623, at 1 (1940) ("Prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court in James v. Dravo Contracting Company, it was the accepted view
that the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction over any lands purchased
with the consent of the State for any of the purposes enumerated in article I,
section 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, and that any provision of a State statute
retaining partial or concurrent jurisdiction was inoperable .... This bill simply
restores to the Federal Government the jurisdiction it was recognized as having
until the Dravo decision was handed down.") (citation omitted).
31. 474 U.S. 876 (1973).
32. United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 209, 213 (2000) ("The leading case (and,
surprisingly, the only appellate authority) on whether § 7(3) applies extra-
territorially is the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Erdos .. )
(citation omitted).
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Equatorial Guinea.33 Erdos, the defendant, was tried and convicted
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1112, which prohibits man-
slaughter in the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States."" Erdos appealed to the Fourth Circuit arguing that
the federal court system lacked jurisdiction because § 7(3), the basis
of jurisdiction for § 1112, did not apply to areas outside the United
States.35
The Fourth Circuit rejected Erdos's argument and determined
that § 7(3) did apply extraterritorially.36 In doing so, the court
parsed the statute and read it in three separate phrases. It
determined "[t]he first two phrases connected by the conjunctive
'and' relate to and modify each other. 3 7 These two phrases read
together, the court reasoned, "create a jurisdictional category: lands
reserved or acquired for the use of the United States and under its
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.,
38
The court acknowledged that the third phrase of § 7(3), that
concerning places "acquired by the United States by consent of the
legislature of the State in which the same shall be," spoke to areas
"presumably within the territorial boundaries of the United
States."39 It further acknowledged that this third phrase could be
read to modify and limit the more general coverage of the
preceding two phrases, leaving the entire statute applicable only
within the United States.4 However, after determining that such a
reading of the statute is plausible, the court concluded that the
phrases should be read independently."
33. Erdos, 474 F.2d at 158.
34. Id. at 158 & n.1.
35. Id. at 159 ("Erdos contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to try
him for an offense committed outside the territorial limits of the United States
because Congress has not exercised its constitutional power so as to extend
American criminal court jurisdiction to the United States Embassy in Equatorial
Guinea. It is urged that 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) must be read to apply only to areas within
the geographical boundaries of the United States and may not be given
extraterritorial effect.").
36. Id. at 158-59 ("We conclude there was jurisdiction and venue.").
37. Id. at 160.
38. Erdos, 474 F.2d at 160.
39. Id. at 159.
40. Id. at 159-60 ("Such an interpretation is not implausible, and, indeed, it is
possible that when the statute was enacted the attention of the Congress was not in
the slightest focused on extraterritorial jurisdiction.").
41. Id. at 160 ("Where the power of Congress is clear and the language of
exercise is broad, we perceive no duty to construe a statute narrowly."); see id.
("We think the third phrase is independent of and does not modify the first two.").
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Based on this reasoning, the court determined that the statute
"describes two kinds of places or lands within the 'special juris-
diction of the United States.' 4 2 It then concluded that § 7(3) "is a
proper grant of 'special' territorial jurisdiction embracing an
embassy in a foreign country acquired for the use of the United
States and under its concurrent jurisdiction. ,
43
B. United States v. Gatlin: Section 7(3) Does Not Apply to
Military Bases Overseas
In June 2000, in United States v. Gatlin,44 the Second Circuit
refused to apply § 7(3) to a United States military base in
Germany. 5 This case involved the sexual molestation of two
minors at the hands of their stepfather, all of whom lived on a
United States military installation in Germany as dependents of a
United States servicewoman.' Gatlin, the defendant, pleaded
guilty and was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York for "sexually abusing a minor while
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) . Gatlin appealed to the
Second Circuit arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over his case because § 7(3) does not apply to property leased by
the United States military overseas.' The Second Circuit agreed
and held, with regret, that § 7(3) did not apply abroad.49
In reaching its decision, the Gatlin court rejected the Fourth
Circuit holding in Erdos for several reasons.' First, the court
accused the Fourth Circuit of failing to apply the proper canon of
statutory construction by ignoring the presumption against extra-
territoriality during its examination of § 7(3).1
42. Id. at 160.
43. Erdos, 474 F.2d at 160.
44. 216 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 2000).
45. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 223 ("In sum, we hold that § 7(3) does not apply
extraterritorially. Therefore, we conclude that [an overseas military installation] is
not within the 'special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,'
and that 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) does not apply to Gatlin's acts.").
46. Id. at 209-10.
47. Id. at 209.
48. Id.
49. Id. ("On appeal, Gatlin argues, inter alia, that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction over his case because the offense took place on property leased by the
United States military in the Federal Republic of Germany. With regret, we
agree."); see supra note 45.
50. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 214.
51. Id. ("First and foremost, the Erdos Court failed to apply the proper
cannon of statutory construction ... the Court held that § 7(3) applies extra-
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In addition, the Gatlin court took issue with the Erdos court's
analysis of the statutory language of § 7(3).52 Specifically, the court
noted that the Erdos court's treatment of the phrases of § 7(3) as
independent of one another was flawed 3 For these reasons, the
court rejected the Erdos holding.
The Second Circuit then conducted its own analysis of § 7(3)'s
legislative history, applying the presumption against extra-
territoriality." Through this analysis, the court concluded, "the
historical development of § 7(3) indicated unequivocally that
Congress, in fact, intended the statute to apply only to lands within
the territorial boundaries of the United States."55
To reach this conclusion, the Gatlin court first examined the
statutory predecessors to § 7(3) -namely the 1790 Act and the 1909
Act-emphasizing that these statutes criminalized acts solely within
the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the United States. 6  The court
determined that because the United States, in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, had exclusive jurisdiction only over land
within the territorial boundaries of the United States, Congress
could not have intended the statutes to apply abroad. 7
The court next examined the 1940 Act, in which Congress
expanded federal court jurisdiction to areas where the federal
government exercised both "exclusive" and "concurrent" juris-
territorially without demanding evidence, much less 'clear evidence' that Congress
intended such a result.").
52. Id. at 215 ("the Erdos Court's analysis of the statutory language was
deeply flawed.").
53. Id. ("[The Erdos Court's reasoning] hardly follows logically from [its] two
unobjectionable premises-namely, that the two parts of § 7(3) are independent
and that the second part, by its terms, applies exclusively to lands within the
United States-that the first part of § 7(3) must or should apply
extraterritorially.").
54. Id. at 214-15 ("Thus, absent 'clear evidence of congressional intent' to
apply a statute extraterritorially, a statute applies only within the territorial United
States.") (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. at 204).
55. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 216.
56. Id at 216. ("By the terms of [the provisions of the 1790 Act], therefore, the
jurisdiction of the federal courts was limited to certain lands within the 'sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."'); id. at 218 ("Accordingly, the 1909
Act, like the 1790 Act, was limited to lands within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States and, therefore, to lands within the territorial boundaries of the
United States.").
57. Id. at 216-17 ("The notion that the United States could exercise exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over lands in a foreign nation ... would have been virtually
inconceivable in the 1790 Act."); id. at 218 ("[T]he limitation of jurisdiction to
lands over which the United States exercises 'exclusive' jurisdiction again makes
plain that [the 1909 Act] did not mean to refer to land in a foreign territory.").
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diction. After acknowledging the addition of "concurrent"
jurisdiction, the court determined from the legislative history of the
Act that Congress did not intend for it to apply extraterritorially
Instead, the court concluded that Congress added "concurrent"
jurisdiction only to expand the reach of federal law to domestic
highways, national parks, and other areas where the federal and
state governments exercised concurrent jurisdiction.'
In sum, the Gatlin court's examination of the legislative history
of § 7(3) and its precursors uncovered no evidence that Congress
intended the statute to apply to lands located beyond the territorial
borders of the United States. Applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the court concluded, accordingly, "Congress, in
fact, intended [§ 7(3)] to apply exclusively to the territorial United
States.",61
C. United States v. Corey: The Ninth Circuit Splits With the
Second Circuit By Applying Section 7(3) Extraterritorially
In November 2000, in United States v. Corey,62 the Ninth
Circuit held that § 7(3) applies to territory outside the borders of
the United States.63 This case involved the molestation of a female
American minor in an apartment located on a United States Air
Force base in Japan.6' The girl's stepfather, Corey, a United States
citizen who lived abroad while working for the United States Air
Force as a civilian postmaster, was charged with the offense.65 The
first trial ended in a hung jury, but, after a second trial, the United
58. Id. at 219.
59. Id. at 219 ("Notwithstanding this change, it is apparent from what little
legislative history there is of the 1940 Act (a Senate Report and a House Report
totaling three pages) that, in making this change, the 76th Congress did not intend
to extend the reach of the statute to lands outside the United States."); id. at 219-
20 ("Nothing in the sparse legislative history of the 1940 Act indicates that
Congress envisaged application of the statute extraterritorially-an application
that would have been significant under both constitutional and international
law.").
60. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 219 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 76-1623, at 2 (1940); S.Rep.
No. 76-1708, at 1 (1940)).
61. Id. at 220.
62. 232 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000).
63. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1172 ("We conclude therefore that subsection 7(3)
applies to Americans in all territory, wherever situated, that is acquired for the use
of the United States and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the
federal government.").
64. Id. at 1169.
65. Id. ("After an investigation, the government charged Corey with
aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and
2242(1).").
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States District Court for the District of Hawaii convicted Corey and
sentenced him to 262 months in prison.6
Corey appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court
lacked jurisdiction and also raising several trial errors.67 In a two-
to-one majority decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected Corey's
argument and affirmed the district court's jurisdiction.68 In so
doing, the court agreed with the Erdos Court that § 7(3) applies
extraterritorially. 6 However, the court reversed the conviction
because of trial errors wholly separate from the jurisdictional
issue.'
In its analysis of § 7(3), the Corey court concluded that the
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply.7  The court
reached this conclusion for three reasons. First, the court noted
that the presumption against extraterritoriality "does not apply
where the legislation implicates concerns that are not inherently
domestic. 7'  The court emphasized that the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Bowman,73 "held that the territorial presumption
does not govern the interpretation of statutes that, by their nature,
implicate legitimate interests of the United States abroad." 4
Relying on Bowman, the court found that it is unnecessary to apply
the presumption when determining the scope of a jurisdictional
statute.75 Since § 7(3) is a jurisdictional statute, the court deter-




68. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1183 ("The district court had jurisdiction to hear the
charges against Corey under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2242(1).").
69. Id. at 1172 ("Our conclusion that subsection 7(3) applies to territory
outside the borders of the fifty states agrees with that of the Fourth Circuit.")
(citation omitted).
70. Id. at 1183 & n.11 ("While we affirm the district court on the jurisdictional
ruling, we reverse the conviction because of errors later at trial.").
71. Id. at 1170 ("[T]he courts do not apply the territorial presumption where it
is not a reliable guide to congressional intent.").
72. Id.
73. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
74, Corey, 232 F.3d at 1170 (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.).
75. Id. at 1171 ("Unlike ordinary domestic statutes, jurisdictional statutes
inherently present the question of how far Congress wishes U.S. law to extend.
There is therefore no reason to presume that Congress did, or did not, mean to act
extraterritorially.").
76. Id. ("'[W]hen presented with the task of interpreting jurisdictional statutes
such as [subsection] 7(3), courts should simply employ the standard tools of
statutory construction ... ') (citing United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d
189, 206 n.32.).
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Second, the court determined "even more than other
jurisdictional statutes, subsection 7(3) is a poor candidate for the
territorial presumption" because "[1]and subject to [the statute] is
not 'extraterritorial' as the Supreme Court has defined the term.,
7
In EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ("Aramco"), the United States
Supreme Court defined "territorial" jurisdiction as "places over
which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of
legislative control., 78 Because § 7(3) applies only to areas under
"exclusive" or "concurrent" jurisdiction of the United States, the
Corey court concluded that the statute purports to regulate conduct
only within lands over which the government holds "legislative
control., 79  Therefore, according to Supreme Court precedent,
§ 7(3) is a weak candidate for the territorial presumption because it
extends only to areas where the United States has some real
measure of legislative control.'
Finally, the Corey court refused to apply the presumption to
§ 7(3) because the policy behind the presumption-to avoid
unintended clashes with foreign powers-would be inapplicable. 1
By its own terms, § 7(3) reaches only those territories over which
the United States exercises legislative control.82 The court noted
that legislative jurisdiction over any foreign lands covered by the
statute could be acquired only through the foreign nation's consent
or through conquest. 83 Therefore, the court concluded, § 7(3) "will
apply only where the foreign sovereign does not or cannot object to
the exercise of [U.S.] jurisdiction."' As such, the court determined
that the policy behind the presumption is inapplicable to § 7(3).85
The Corey court next turned to the language and structure of
the statute and determined that "even if the presumption were
applicable, the text of section 7 would clearly rebut it. '86 The court
77. Id.
78. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
79. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171 ("Subsection 7(3) does not purport to regulate
conduct within territory over which the United States lacks 'some measure of
legislative control'; by its terms, it extends only to areas within the concurrent or
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.").
80. This position was also taken by the D.C. Circuit. See Environmental
Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[W]here the U.S. has
some real measure of legislative control over the region at issue, the presumption
against extraterritoriality is much weaker.").
81. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.).
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1171.
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concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 7, when read as a whole, "extends the
jurisdiction of the federal criminal laws to areas where American
citizens and property need protection, yet no other government
effectively safeguards those interests."87 To reach this conclusion,
the court examined the individual sections of § 7 and noted that
every subsection, except § 7(3), mentions spaces outside the United
States.' The court then concluded that § 7(3) should be read
"against the extraterritorial backdrop of its neighbors."8 9
Additionally, the court criticized the Gatlin court for reading § 7(3)
independently of the other subsections of § 7.'
After discounting the application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the Corey court turned to the legislative history
of § 7(3) and its precursors. Here, the court accused the Second
Circuit in Gatlin of "failing to take into account our nation's rapid
territorial expansion during the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries."91 The Corey court rejected the Gatlin court's conclusion
that the "exclusive" jurisdiction language in the 1790 Act and 1909
Act made it virtually inconceivable that Congress intended
extraterritorial application.'
Instead, the Corey court determined that nineteenth century
Americans could well have believed that they could exercise
"exclusive" jurisdiction over a territory outside the borders of the
United States.93 To support this determination, the court noted that
in the nineteenth century the United States acquired, by means of
purchase or conquest, several territories outside its then-existing
national borders.94 This, the court found, led to the conclusion that
87. Id.
88. Id. ("Every other subsection mentions spaces outside the fifty states.
Section 7 reaches vessels sailing on the high seas, subsection 7(1), or on
international waterways, subsection 7(2); islands prized for their rich bird
droppings, subsection 7(4); airplanes flying the friendly skies, subsection 7(5);
NASA spaceships rocketing towards Mars, subsection 7(6); Antarctica, subsection
7(7); and foreign ships coming to America, subsection 7(8).").
89. Id. (We construe subsection 7(3) against the extraterritorial backdrop of its
neighbors.").
90. Id. at 1175 ("Gatlin also erred, in our view, by considering subsection 7(3)
in isolation from its neighboring subsections.. .
91. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1175.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1173 ("But nineteenth century Americans were hardly so parochial.
While they may have believed that, so long as a territory remained unequivocally
foreign, it lay outside the jurisdiction of the United States, they were well aware
that territory could change hands, and the United States could gain exclusive
jurisdiction over territory that other countries claimed as their own.") (citing Jones
v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)).
94. Id. ("Over the course of the nineteenth century, the United States
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the nineteenth century "was clearly not a time when Americans
thought of their borders as static or of foreign territory as
sacrosanct." 95
The Corey court also emphasized that Congress expanded
federal criminal jurisdiction to reach these newly acquired
territories, on both the North American continent and overseas.96
Moreover, the court noted, the Supreme Court extended "sole and
exclusive" jurisdiction to new western territories as they were
acquired by the government.97 All of this caused the court to
conclude that "in the nineteenth century, the special territorial
jurisdiction of the United States included vast expanses of territory
beyond the boundaries of the states." 98  Therefore, the court
determined, Gatlin was incorrect in its analysis of legislative history
and, instead, the precursors to § 7(3) did apply extraterritorially. 9
The Corey court also rejected the Gatlin court's conclusion
that the "concurrent" jurisdiction language was added to the 1940
Act merely to expand the reach of federal law within the fifty
states.1° Instead, finding that Congress showed no intention of
limiting the jurisdiction of § 7(3)'s precursors based on geography,
the court determined that there was "no reason then to presume
that when, in 1940, Congress extended criminal jurisdiction to those
lands under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States, it
intended to limit the reach of subsection 7(3) to areas under the
concurrent authority of the states, but not those under the
concurrent authority of other sovereigns."10' Thus, the Corey court
determined that § 7(3) applied extraterritorially"
purchased Louisiana from France; won Florida from Spain; defeated numerous
Indian nations; annexed the Republic of Texas; divided Oregon with the British;
conquered Mexico's California possessions; purchased Alaska from Russia; and
annexed Hawaii.").
95. Id.
96. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1174 ("As the United States acquired new possessions,
Congress extended federal criminal jurisdiction with the boundaries of the young
republic."); see also id. ("In extending the reach of United States jurisdiction,
Congress did not stop with the continental possessions of the nation.").
97. Id. at 1174 ("As the United States expanded across the continent, the
Supreme Court extended the 'sole and exclusive' jurisdiction to all the unsettled
territories in the American West.").
98. Id. at 1174.
99. Id. at 1175.
100. Id.
101. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1175.
102. Id. ("We conclude therefore that subsection 7(3) applies to Americans in
all territory, wherever situated, that is acquired for the use of the United States
and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the federal government.").
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge McKeown argued that the court
did not have jurisdiction in this case.0 3 The dissent stated that, in
holding that § 7(3) applied extraterritorially, the majority created a
circuit split, adopted an unprecedented view of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and misinterpreted the statute.
14
On the issue of the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
dissent harshly criticized the majority's approach. 15  Unlike the
majority, the dissent argued that jurisdictional statutes "do not
necessarily indicate whether Congress intended extraterritorial
jurisdiction."'" Specifically, the dissent argued that § 7(3) defines
"territorial" jurisdiction, not "extraterritorial" jurisdiction. 7
Therefore, it is still necessary to determine whether Congress
intended the statute to apply to land outside the boundaries of the
United States."u To hold otherwise "would allow an end-run
around the requirement that Congress must be explicit in
demonstrating its intent to legislate extraterritorially."' 9
The dissent attributed the majority's mistaken rejection of the
presumption to its misapplication of United States v. Bowman."'
Bowman created a narrow exception to the presumption against
extraterritoriality for "criminal statutes which are, as a class, not
logically dependent on their locality for the Government's juris-
diction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated,
especially by its own citizens, officers, or agents."''. The dissent
argued that the narrow exception created in Bowman does not
cover § 7(3) and that the majority erred in so holding."2
The dissent also criticized the majority's second argument
against applying the presumption, namely that, according to
103. Id. at 1183 ("The central and threshold question in this appeal is whether
certain sections of the federal criminal code, specifically 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and
2242(1), apply extraterritorially so as to reach crimes committed on foreign soil. I
conclude that they do not and therefore respectfully dissent.") (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
104. Id. at 1184 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1186 ("The majority's effort to avoid the presumption because § 7(3)
defines territorial jurisdiction is bootstrapping at its worst.") (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
106. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1186. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1187 ("In its effort to avoid the presumption against extra-
territoriality, the majority extends Bowman far beyond its holding or any
reasonable extension of it.") (McKeown, J., dissenting).
111. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
112. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1187 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court precedent in Aramco, § 7(3) is territorial because it
covers only land that the United States exercises legislative control
over."3 The dissent noted that such an interpretation of Aramco
"would eviscerate the concept of extraterritoriality. '" 4  If
"territorial" is read to include foreign lands where U.S. law applies,
the dissent argued, "then the presumption against extraterritoriality
is pointless because there would be no 'extraterritorial' application
of U.S. law."" 5
After determining that the majority erred in not applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the dissent undertook its
own analysis of the statute. First, examining the text of the statute,
the dissent found the language to be ambiguous and in no way
indicative of a congressional intent of extraterritorial application.16
The dissent admitted that it was possible to read "any lands" as
including foreign lands, but noted, "a 'plausible' reading of a statute
does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality."" 7
The dissent then concluded, "the fact that the statute has spawned
such a multiplicity of interpretations, ranging from Gatlin to Erdos
to the majority, underscores not only the ambiguity of the statute
but also the need for the presumption itself."'"8
The dissent next examined the structure of the statute."9 Here,
the dissent rejected the majority's method of reading the extra-
territorial effect of the other subsections of § 7 into § 7(3)."'
Instead, the dissent found the fact that Congress explicitly chose to
legislate extraterritorially in the other subsections of § 7, but not in
§ 7(3), is a clear indication that the Congress did not intend § 7(3)
to apply extraterritorially. 12'
Finally, the dissent examined the legislative history of the
statute and its precursors. Here, the dissent criticized the majority's
attempt to find support of its opinion through reference to the
history of American expansion throughout the nineteenth
113. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1188 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1189 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
117. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1189. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1191 ("This statute is a poster-
child for ambiguity-every court attempting to construe and harmonize the statute
goes through contortions trying to explain what Congress meant but did not say.")
(McKeown, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1189 (McKweon, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1190 ("[T]he highly piecemeal fashion in which § 7 was compiled
undermines the majority's attempt to read the statute holistically.") (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
121. Id. at 1190-91 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
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century.22 In its own analysis of the legislative history of § 7(3) and
its precursors, the dissent essentially reiterated the Gatlin court's
findings and determined that the history contains no indication of a
congressional intent of extraterritorial application.'13 Therefore, it
concluded, "[t]he legislative history points to one conclusion: § 7(3)
applies only in the domestic context, not to federal criminal
jurisdiction beyond our borders." 2'
IV. Appropriate Application of Section 7(3) and the Errors of
Erdos and Corey.
Both Erdos and Corey are based on incorrect tests in that they
failed to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Additionally, Corey is based on an overly broad interpretation of
legislative history. For these reasons, neither decision should be
followed.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Should Be Applied
to Section 7(3)
As discussed in Section II(A),2' the United States Supreme
Court has explicitly established that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should be applied absent evidence of congress-
ional intent to apply a federal statute beyond the borders of the
United States. On its face, § 7(3) contains no such evidence. The
language of the statute is ambiguous and does not in any way
demonstrate a congressional intent to extend jurisdiction beyond
the boundaries of the United States. As the Corey dissent stated,
"the fact that the statute has spawned such a multiplicity of
interpretations, ranging from Gatlin to Erdos to the [Corey]
majority, underscores not only the ambiguity of the statute but also
the need for the presumption itself." '26 As the Corey dissent aptly
stated, "[tihis statute is a poster-child for ambiguity-every court
attempting to construe and harmonize the statute goes through
contortions trying to explain what Congress meant but did not
122. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1193 ("The majority's effort to find support through the
reference to the history of our nation's westward expansion and overseas
acquisitions in no way informs the question here. Rather, the history demonstrates
simply that Congress knew how to extend explicitly the reach of the federal
criminal code when it so desired.") (McKeown, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 1191-93 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1193 (McKeown, J., digsenting).
125. See supra Part II.A.
126. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1189 (McKweon, J., dissenting).
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say. '1 27 Therefore, due to the ambiguous language of § 7(3) the
presumption against extraterritoriality should be applied.
Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history of § 7(3)
demonstrates a congressional intent of extraterritorial application.
Quite the contrary, the available legislative history of § 7(3) and its
precursors reveals that Congress did not, in fact, intend § 7(3) to
apply outside the continental United States.'2 This is evidenced by
various statements made by Senators and Representatives through-
out the evolution of § 7(3) that indicate Congress was not
attempting to enlarge the jurisdiction of United States courts.
The ambiguous nature of the statutory text, along with the
complete absence of evidence of an intent of extraterritorial
application in the legislative history leads to one conclusion: § 7(3)
does not apply outside the borders of the United States.
B. Error of Erdos: Failure to Apply the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality
The Fourth Circuit, in Erdos, stated that "[w]here the power of
the Congress is clear, and the language of exercise is broad, we
perceive no duty to construe a statute narrowly."129  As noted
above, the correct test requires the presence of a clear intent by
Congress, not merely congressional empowerment, to effectuate
extraterritorial application of a federal statute. Since neither the
text of § 7(3) nor its legislative history contain clear evidence of
extraterritorial application, the Fourth Circuit erred by failing to
employ the proper test to determine congressional intent. Had it
done so, the court likely would have reached the appropriate
conclusion: § 7(3) does not apply extraterritorially.
C. Errors of Corey: Failure to Apply the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality and Overreaching Resort to History
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in Corey, erred by
failing to apply the presumption. The Corey court determined that
application of the presumption is unnecessary because it opined
that § 7(3) is a jurisdictional statute and, therefore, in accordance
with Bowman, not subject to the presumption;"3 that § 7(3) applies
only to territorial lands; 3' and that extraterritorial application
127. Id. at 1191 (McKweon, J., dissenting).
128. See supra Part II.B.
129. United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 160 (1973).
130. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1171 (2000).
131. Id.
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would not cause unintended clashes with foreign powers.1 3' The
court also determined that, even if the presumption was applied, an
extraterritorial effect that rebuts the presumption should be read
into § 7(3) by reading § 7 as a whole.133 As discussed below, all of
these arguments are unconvincing.
The Corey dissent addressed each of the majority's arguments
listed above and correctly noted the errors inherent in each. These
errors are outlined in detail in Section III(C),134 and need not be
repeated here. The bottom line is that each reason the Corey court
provided for not applying the presumption was flawed and
unconvincing. As the dissent noted, the majority had essentially
manufactured congressional intent "by substituting a judicial policy
for a congressional one."
35
The Corey court also erred in its overly broad interpretation of
the legislative history of § 7(3). In determining that Congress
intended § 7(3) to apply outside the United States, the Corey court
embarked on a journey through eighteenth and nineteenth century
American history chronicling any event that might support the
notion that Congress could have intended § 7(3)'s precursors to
apply outside the United States.1 36 The court made much of the
territorial expansion of the United States throughout these
centuries and emphasized that the government was actively gaining
new territories through annexation, purchase, and conquest.
37
Although interesting and informative, this historical digression had
no bearing on the issue at hand: whether the legislative history of §
7(3) supports a finding that the statute applies extraterritorially.
The Supreme Court has provided that courts should consider
all evidence, including statutory text, structure, and legislative
history when determining whether Congress intended a statute to
apply extraterritorially1 38  Nowhere, however, did the Court
provide that it would be appropriate for the judiciary to comb
through the general history of our nation to surmise what Congress
may have been thinking when it enacted legislation. By doing so,
the Ninth Circuit applied an interpretive method much broader
than anything recognized as appropriate by the Supreme Court.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra Part III.C.
135. Corey, 232 F.3d at 1191 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 1173-76.
137. See id.
138. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993).
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This, along with the court's failure to apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality, was an error.
V. Enactment of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of
2000: An Indication That Congress Recognizes a
Jurisdictional Gap
The Second Circuit, in Gatlin, recognized the existence of a
jurisdictional gap for civilians accompanying the armed forces
overseas."' The court determined that since § 7(3) did not apply
extraterritorially, federal courts lacked jurisdiction to try civilians
who commit crimes abroad and that such individuals are subject to
prosecution only by the country in which the crimes are
committed. n Recognizing this jurisdictional gap, the court took the
unusual step of forwarding a copy of its opinion to the Chairmen of
the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.'4 '
The Gatlin court noted that this gap existed since the Supreme
Court ruling in Reid v. Covert,'42 where the Court held that military
courts martial could not exercise jurisdiction over civilians.' 43 Prior
to Reid, the military had exercised such jurisdiction over civilians
who committed crimes while accompanying the military overseas."
The court noted that, following the Reid decision, the existence of a
jurisdictional gap was recognized by representatives of the armed
forces,' 45 executive branch officials,'"6 members of government141•1447
commissions, and academic commentators. 8
In November 2000, five months after the Gatlin decision, the
106th Congress enacted the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act of 2000.149 This new law established federal court jurisdiction
139. United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 209, 223 (2000) ("Our decision today is
only the latest consequence of Congress's failure to close this jurisdictional gap.").
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
143. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 220.
144. Id. at 220 n.15.
145. Id. at 222 n.17 (citing statements by several representatives of the armed
forces before Senate and House subcommittee).
146. Id. at 222 n.18 (citing statements referencing the existence of a
jurisdictional gap by several executive branch officials before Senate and House
subcommittees).
147. Id. at 222 n.19 (citing reports recognizing the existence of a jurisdictional
gap by several government commission officials recognizing the existence of a
jurisdictional gap).
148. Gatlin, 216 F.3d. at 222 n.20 (citing articles by several independent scholars
recognizing the existence of a jurisdictional gap).
149. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114
Stat. 2488 (2000).
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for "[c]riminal offenses committed by certain members of the
Armed Forces and by persons employed by or accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States."'
Both the majority and dissent in Corey interpreted the
enactment of this law as an indication that their respective opinions
on the extraterritorial application of § 7(3) were correct. The
dissent noted that by passing this legislation, Congress recognized
the existence of a jurisdictional gap and, therefore, by implication,
that § 7(3) does not fill the gap."' The majority, on the other hand,
viewed the recent legislation as proof that Congress did not believe
a gap existed.'52 If it had, the majority argued, Congress would not
have waited decades to fill the gap.'53 Instead, Congress was
reacting to Gatlin's novel interpretation of § 7(3) and intending
only to eliminate the circuit split."'
The Corey majority's reasoning is unconvincing. Congress's
failure to pass this legislation until just recently cannot be
explained. However, the fact that there have been multiple failed
congressional attempts to pass this legislation over a period of
several decades is in no way indicative that Congress did not
believe there was a jurisdictional gap. Further, it is doubtful that
Congress would go to the trouble of enacting duplicative legislation
merely to remove a split in the federal circuits.
In contrast, the dissent's logic is persuasive: the recent
enactment of this legislation is "confirmatory 'icing on the cake"'
that Congress does not believe § 7(3) applies extraterritorially. "5 It
is inconceivable that Congress would enact legislation to establish
jurisdiction over individuals if such jurisdiction was already in place.
Considering the lengthy and tedious process involved in law
making, such repetition is unlikely. Thus, the enactment of the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act is further proof that
Congress does not perceive extraterritorial application of § 7(3).
VI. Conclusion
There can be no question that Congress has the power to enact
legislation that reaches the conduct of United States nationals
abroad. In 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), Congress has not chosen to do so.
150. Id.
151. United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1197 (2000) (McKeown, J.,
dissenting).
152. Id. at 1173 n.3.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1196 (McKweon, J., dissenting).
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Despite the recent debate in the federal circuit courts of appeal, the
text of § 7(3), its legislative history, and judicial precedent all
indicate that the statute should not be applied extraterritorially. If
Congress had intended to effectuate an extraterritorial reach in this
statute, it would have explicitly provided so as it did in several other
subsections of § 7. Congress, however, intended § 7(3) to apply
only within the territorial boundaries of the United States.
As the Supreme Court has held, a statute that does not contain
clear evidence of a congressional intent of extraterritorial applica-
tion should be presumed to apply only within the borders of the
United States.' Section 7(3) is an ambiguously worded statute
whose legislative history contains no indication of a congressional
intent of extraterritorial application. As such, it is the epitome of a
statute to which the presumption against extraterritoriality must be
applied.
Congress's recent enactment of the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act provides further evidence that Congress does not
believe that § 7(3) applies extraterritorially. If the statute did apply
extraterritorially, Congress would have had no purpose to pass this
recent legislation.
In holding that § 7(3) applies extraterritorially, the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits attempted to fill a jurisdictional gap to prevent
criminals from escaping justice. Noble as this may seem, it amounts
to judicial policy-making. Congress alone, through properly
enacted legislation, has the power to reach the conduct of United
States nationals abroad.
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits' conclusions that § 7(3) applies
beyond the borders of the United States set a dangerous precedent.
This statute applies to the "special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States."'57 It would be an affront to foreign
states to construe portions of their sovereign as territory of the
United States or land subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. Yet, by applying § 7(3) extraterritorially, that is
precisely what the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have done.
Furthermore, this application could potentially place not only U.S.
nationals but also foreign citizens under U.S. jurisdiction for certain.
crimes committed in foreign territories mistakenly construed as
being under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United
States.
156. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,204 (1993).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1994).
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In conclusion, courts should now reject the reasoning of the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits in favor of the Second Circuit's holding
in Gatlin. To hold otherwise would be a misapplication of
established precedent and an offense to international law.
